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NOTE

NOT JUST ANOTHER FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION CASE

INTRODUCTION

Sierra Club v. Hodel' is a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case which
has broad implications for federal land managers by limiting federal
discretion and authority on the public lands. The Tenth Circuit held that
the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA)2 does not pre-empt
state law when a right-of-way, 3 granted under Revised Statutes 2477 (R.S.
2477), 4 is expanded. The effect of applying state law on public lands

with protected areas is potentially enormous and flies in the face of
Congress' intent in enacting FLPMA to centralize management of the
federal lands.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Burr Trail is a sixty-six-mile, one-lane dirt road which connects
Boulder, Utah with Lake Powell's Bullfrog Basin Marina. The road winds

across or next to a national park, a national recreation area, unreserved
federal lands, 5 a wilderness study area, and an instant study area. 6 Used
during the late 1800s and early 1900s to assist oil exploration, the trail
has been used since the 1930s for transportation, development, and tourist
!. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988).
2. Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified in scattered
sections of titles 7, 16, 30, 40, 43 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
3. A right-of-way "includes an easement, lease, permit, or license to occupy, use, or traverse
43 U.S.C. § 1702(f) (1982). A right-of-way is granted under FLPMA for such
public lands ....
things as reseryoirs, canals, pipelines, roads, trails, etc. Id. § 1761.
4. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands, and for
other Purposes, 14 Star. 253 (1866), repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976,
43 U.S.C. 932 (1982).
5. Reserved lands are public lands withdrawn from the public domain and dedicated to a "specified
purpose, more or less permanently." G. Coggins & C. Wilkinson, Federal Public Land and Resources
Law 239 (2nd ed. 1987). Reservations include national forests and national parks, among others.
Unreserved land is public land which has not been withdrawn and dedicated. Id.
6. An instant study area is a natural or primitive area designated for wilderness review, such as
the North Escalante Canyons in Utah, prior to November 1, 1975. A wilderness study area was
designated for wilderness review under the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).
43 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982). FLPMA requires the Secretary of the Interior to review public lands with
wilderness characteristics and submit a report to the President as to the "suitability or nonsuitability
of each" area reviewed. Id. § 1782. An interim management policy governs Bureau of Land Management (BLM) administration of these areas. United States Department of the Interior, H-8550-1,
Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Lands under Wilderness Review (1987).
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needs. Public uses and the county's maintenance of the trail resulted in
creation of a right-of-way in Garfield County pursuant to R.S. 2477, a
federal statute.*
Garfield County's 1986 plan to upgrade the western twenty-eight miles
of the trail, which borders the two wilderness study areas, into an improved two-lane graveled road" was challenged by the Sierra Club and
other environmental groups.' The Sierra Club brought suit against the
Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior and one of its
divisions, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and Garfield County
out of concern for the impact that construction and increased travel would
have on the area. The basis of the complaint, among others not relevant
to this note,' 0 was that the road improvement would extend the roadway
beyond the county's right-of-way, and thus would encroach on federal
lands.
Sierra Club asserted that the scope right-of-way should be defined by
federal law." Under federal law, according to the literal terms of the R.S.
2477 grant, "actual construction," that is, the road as used and maintained
by the county, defines the scope of the right-of-way. 2 Garfield County
maintained that its right-of-way was defined by Utah state law and, therefore, its scope was what was "reasonable and necessary" to serve the
county's transportation needs.' 3
The United States District Court for the Central District of Utah held
that state law defines the scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, and thus
the road improvement fell within the county's right-of-way. "4 The district
court found that Garfield County had the authority under Utah law to
improve the roadway in a manner which is "reasonable and necessary"
7. R.S. 2477 § 8 states, "And be itfurther enacted, That the fight of way for the construction of
highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted." R.S. 2477, 14 Stat.
253 (1866) (repealed 1976).
8. The county plans to improve, as well as pave, the entire sixty-six mile trail. These plans were
not part of the proposal challenged. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1073 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988).
9. Joining the Sierra Club were the National Parks and Conservation Association, Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, and the Wilderness Society. id.
10. Other allegations were that the county was not authorized by the BLM to improve the roadway,
the improvements would degrade wilderness study areas and impair their suitability for wilderness
designation, and BLM failed to study the environmental impacts in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Id. at 1073.
1I. id. at 1079.
12. Id. at 1079-80.
13. Id. at 1079.
14. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F.Supp. 594, 606-08 (C.D. Utah 1987) aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
848 F2d at 1073. The court found that one part of the proposal threatened the wilderness study
areas and therefore ordered the county to seek a FLPMA permit to relocate part of the road outside
the existing right-of-way. Id. at 611. In addition, BLM, the federal agency responsible for administering the federal public lands, was ordered to study plant life along the trail, to monitor construction
near archaeological sites, and to direct alterations in the plan where necessary to protect plant life
and archaeological sites. Id. at 617.
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under the circumstances. "5Both sides appealed parts of the district court's
rulings. "6
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's7
finding that state law defines the scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.
The court also found that the county's plan fell within their right-of-way
as defined by state law, and therefore the county could proceed with their
improvements to the trail upon completion of an environmental assessment by BLM."8
BACKGROUND
In 1866, Congress enacted R.S. 2477 which granted a "right of way
for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public
uses. .. ."' R.S. 2477 did not specify the requirements or methods to
be used in establishing highways over public lands.' In addition, BLM
regulations did not require permission or approval by the federal government for state governmental entities to obtain a right-of-way. 2' Highways at that time were constructed across federal public lands without
formal approval, such as a written easement or deed for the right-of-way,
from the federal goverment.22
In 1976, Congress passed FLPMA, giving BLM what has been described as a "permanent, comprehensive, and self-contained statutory
base for management of the land and other resources under its jurisdiction.... . "23 FLPMA repealed R.S. 247724 and replaced it with a com15. Id. at 605-08. The court also held that where the right-of-way passes between the study areas,
the right-of-way may impact the study areas regardless of whether the proposed wilderness designation
might be endangered. id. at 610-11. In addition, the court found that BLM's participation in the
road improvement constitutes major federal action under NEPA, but the project will not have a
major impact on the human environment and thus BLM does not have to prepare an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS). Id. at 612-15. Even if there was to be a significant impact, the material
prepared before and at trial is substantially the same as an EIS. Id. at 615-17.
16. Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1074.
17. Id. at 1083.
18. Id. at 1085, 1096.
19. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal over the Public Lands, and for other
Purposes, ch. 262 § 8, 14 Stat. 253 (1866), repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. 932 (1982),
20. See, e.g., Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal.App.2d 843, -,
158 P.2d 207, 209 (1945). "Congress
did not specify or limit the methods to be followed in the establishment of such highways." Id. at
, 158 P.2d at 209.
2i. See Roads Over Public Lands Under R.S. 2477,43 C.FR. § 2822.1-1 (1979) ("No application
should be filed under R.S. 2477, as no action on the part of the Government is necessary.")
22. Rippley, Highway Rights-of-Way on Public Lands, 9 Trans. L.J. 121 (1977).
23. Leshy, Wilderness and Its Discontents- Wilderness Review Comes to the Public Lands, 1981
Ariz. St. L.J. 361, 369,
24. 43 U.S.C. § 932 (1982). FLPMA repealed "partially or totally thirty statutes which previously
authorized rights-of-way...." Morrison, Rights-of-Way on Federally Owned Lands: A Journey
through the Statutes by Way of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 9 Transp.
L.J. 97, 101 (1977).
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prehensive system for granting and managing rights-of-way." In other
words, the open-ended invitation to establish fights-of-way under R.S.
2477 to encourage the "expansion, exploitation and development of the
public lands" 26 was replaced by a system for "conservation, protection
and preservation of the public lands." 27
Even though R.S. 2477 was repealed, fights-of-way in existence at the
time of FLMPA's passage were preserved. 28 Thus, when dealing with a
right-of-way across unreserved public land, whether a fight-of-way was
established or accepted under R.S. 2477 and what the scope of the fightof-way is must be established. With regard to establishment, the general
view is that state statutory and common law dictate the establishment of
rights-of-way for public highways over unreserved public lands.29 R.S.
2477 was "an offer of fights of way in general (to the public], and it

operated as a grant of specific fights upon the selection of routes and the

establishment of roads over public land." 3" In other words, acceptance
of an R.S. 2477 grant usually required "proof of affirmative acts of taking
possession by public authorities or by general use by the public, provided
the use is sufficient to constitute acceptance."3"

Although the general view is that state law defines whether an R.S.

2477 grant has been accepted, 32 the idea was challenged under rules of
statutory construction. In Wilkenson v. United States Department of In-

terior,33 the United States Department of Interior argued that under the
rule of statutory construction, every word in a statute must be given

effect,34 and that for a grant 35
to be accepted, the statute requires actual
"construction" of a highway. The Department of Interior agreed that
the statute is applied "by reference to state law to determine when the
25. Morrison, supra note 24, at 98-101.
26. Wilkenson v. Dept of Interior of United States, 634 FSupp. 1265, 1275 (D. Col. 1986).
27. Id. According to the statute, public land is to be retained in federal ownership unless its
disposal "will serve the national interest." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982).
28. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, Savings Provision (a) & (h) and 1769 (1982) ("Nothing ... shall
have the effect of terminating any right-of-way ... heretofore issued, granted, or permitted.")
29. See, e.g,, Lovelace v. Hightower, 50 NM 50, 52, 168 P.2d 864, 866 (1946) ("[Highways
can be established only as provided by the statute quoted ... unless they can be established by a
prescriptive user."), Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal.App.2d at - , 158 P.2d at 209 (To become a public
highway, a road must "be established in accordance with the laws of the state in which it was
located").
30. Ball, 68 CaI.App.2d at -,
158 P.2d at 209.
31. Lovelace, 50 NM at 54-5, 168 P.2d at 867. To establish a highway by use, in general, the
public must use the road "For such length of time and under such circumstances as to indicate
clearly an intention on the part of the public to accept the grant is sufficient." Rippley, supra note
22, at 122. However, there seems to be "some divergence of opinion" on what is required to establish
a highway by public authority. Id. at 123-124.
32. Rippley, supra note 22, at 121.
33. 634 F.Supp. 1265, 1272 (D. Col. 1986).
34. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-9 (1955).
35. Other courts have held that actual construction fulfills the requirement for accepting an R.S.
2477 grant of right-of-way. See Humboldt County v. United States, 684 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1982)
and United States v. Gates of the Mountains Lakeshore Homes, 732 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1984).
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offer of grant has been accepted by the 'construction of highways.""
However, Interior disagreed that "mere use," as state law defined acceptance, was enough to constitute construction of a highway.3" Interior
argued that there must be actual construction of a highway.38 Nonetheless,
the United States District Court for Colorado applied state law and found
mere use sufficient, holding that right-of-way means access to land for
traveling across it,39 not a roadway constructed over a definite route.'
Once an R.S. right-of-way has been determined, the scope of the
established right-of-way must be decided, especially when improvements
in the right-of-way are planned. Some states have fixed the width of the
highway's right-of-way by statute.4 Other states have to rely on state

courts to authoritatively determine the width of the right-of-way.42 Many
state courts have determined the width to be that which is "reasonably
necessary" or as "recognized by the local laws, customs, and usages."'
In United States v. Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co.," a case involving a
statute providing for the establishment of public highways by the state
or local authorities across Indian land according to state law, the United
States Supreme Court rejected an argument that the federal government
should define the scope of a highway.45 The statute provided that the
public highway be opened and established "in accordance with the laws
of the State or Territory in which the lands are situated .... ," Therefore,
the Court held that state law should be applied to determine the scope of
the right-of-way "in the absence of any governing administrative ruling,
statute, or dominating consideration of Congressional policy to the contra.

36. Wilkenson at 1272.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1083 (10th Cir. 1988).
42. See, e.g., Costain v. Turner County, 72 S.D. 427, -. , 36 N.W.2d 382, 383 (1949) (Section
lines in Territory declared public highways and width of public highway along section lines was
sixty-six feet.)
43. Rippley, supra note 22, at 125. See, e.g., Bishop v. Hawley, 33 Wyo. 271, 238 P. 284 (1925)
"[A]ssume that Congress intended... to grant only rights of way reasonably necessary for the use
of the general public." Id. 33 Wyo. at -, 238 P. at 286. City of Butte v. Mikoswitz, 39 Mont.
350, 102 P. 593 (1909) "Congress must have intended such a highway as is recognized by the local
laws, customs, and usages." Id. 39 Mont. at -,
102 P. at 596.
44. 318 U.S. 206 (1942).
45. Id. at 209.
46. 25 U.S.C. § 311 (1982) gave the Secretary of the Interior authorization "to grant permission
, to the proper State or local authorities for the opening and establishment of public highways,
in accordance with the laws of the State or Territory in which the lands are situated, through any
Indian reservation or through any lands which have been allotted in severalty to any individual
Indians under any laws or treaties but which have not yet been conveyed to the allottees with full
power of alienation."
47. Oklahoma Gas Co., 318 U.S. at 210 (referring to Act of Marh 3, 1901, 25 U.S.C. §311
(1982)),
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However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
distinguished the holding in Oklahoma Gas in United States v. Gates of
the Mountains Lakeshore Homes." The court, in deciding whether federal
law or state law determined whether a power transmission is within the
scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, compared the statutes involved in
Oklahoma Gas and Gates.4 The court specifically pointed to the fact that
whereas the statute in Oklahoma Gas incorporates state law, the statute
in Gates, R.S. 2477, makes no reference to or incorporation of state
law.-' In addition, doubts "as to the extent of the grant . . . [of a rightof-way] must be resolved in government's favor." 5 Therefore, the court
was free to decide that federal law prohibits a power transmission from
being included in an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. 2
Pre-emption Factors
In controversies involving federal law, the United States Supreme Court
looks to three factors to determine whether to adopt a state law or create
a nationwide federal rule. 5 First, whether or not a nationally uniform
body of law is necessary in situations similar to the controversy involved
is determined.' Second, whether or not using state law to decide the
controversy would frustrate federal objectives or functions is determined. 55 Finally, whether or not a federal rule would adversely impact
relationships created under state law is determined.56 Wilson v. Omaha
Indian Tribe 7 applied these factors to a boundary dispute involving the
State of Iowa and the Omaha Indian Tribe. In deciding that state law
should control, the Supreme Court found that evenhanded application of
the particular state law would not cause injury to tribes and that private
landowners' reliance on the state's determination of the boundary needed
to be given substantial consideration."
ANALYSIS
The Tenth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Hodel rejected federal law as
determinative of the scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way based on agency
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

732 F.2d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 1413-14.
Id. at 1413.
Id. at 1414.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
Id.
id.
Id. at 728-29.
442 U.S. 653 (1979).
Id. at 672-74.
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interpretation," 9 state case law,' and application of the Supreme Court's
analysis in Wilson.6 However, the Wilson factors applied in the context
of FLPMA demand the application of federal, not state, law.62
The Tenth Circuit found that the first Wilson factor, the need for uniformity in dealing with R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, provided only minimal
support for choosing federal law.63 Although the court admitted that FLPMA
"embodies a congressional intent to centralize and systematize the management of public lands"M which could be advanced by a uniform rule
of law for rights-of-way, the court nonetheless found FLPMA irrelevant
because FLPMA did not exist at the time of R.S. 2477's passage.' The
court looked solely to Congress' intent when passing R.S. 2477 and found
no support for uniformity.'
The court's focus on R.S. 2477 and the 123-year-old legislative history
to determine the need for a nationally uniform body of law today seems
misplaced. FLPMA repealed R.S. 2477 and other right-of-way statutes
and replaced them with a single section of FLPMA-Title V.67
Title V contains technical, financial, and environmental controls on
occupancy and use of rights-of-way." Title V of FLPMA provides a
system for granting, renewing, and issuing rights-of-way.69 Applicants
are required to submit plans and other information relating to the rightsof-way use. ° The applicants may also be required to submit plans for
rehabilitation if adverse environmental impacts may result. 7' No right59. The court found heavy support for a state law definition in the Secretary of the Interior's
interpretation of R.S. 2477. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1080 (10th Cir. 1988). The court
also determined that BLM had consistently followed the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation,
in spite of evidence to the contrary. Id. at 1080-81.
60. The court decided that applying federal law to determine the scope of an R.S. 2477 rightof-way would conflict with "over a century of state court jurisprudence." Id. at 1081. The court
also found no controlling precedent in previous cases, such as Gates, in spite of the fact R.S. 2477
was addressed based upon the narrowness of the holding. Id. at 1081.
61. The court made the Wilson analysis only "to fully meet Sierra Club's arguments and to
demonstrate that it does not dictate a different result than that we reach without it." Id. at 1082
n.12. The Wilson analysis is explored because it provides astrong basis for policy arguments involving
FLPMA.
62. R.S. 2477 § 8 granting public highways across unreserved federal lands does not reference
state or federal law. Strangely, however, Congress did adopt state or local law for interpreting or
administering §§ I, 2, 5, 9 of the 1866 act and asserted federal law or regulations for §§ 7, 10, 11
of the act. An Act Granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public Lands,
and for other Purposes, 14 Stat. 253 (1866), repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of
1976, 43 U.S.C. 932 (1982).
63. Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1082.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1771 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
68. Id. § 1765.
69. Morrison, supra note 24, at 101.
70. 43 U.S.C. § 1764(d).
71. Id.
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of-way can be granted unless the applicant has the technical and financial
capability.72 In addition, numerous methods for controls on occupancy
and use are provided.73
Thus, FLPMA's repeal of R.S. 2477 and the detailed procedures outlined in FLPMA should make FLPMA, not R.S. 2477, the basis for
determining whether Congress has intended uniformity. Clearly, Congress
demonstrated such intent in the language of FLPMA.74 Congress intended
uniformity in the governing of rights-of-way on federal land and, therefore, it is incongruous that state law be applied in determining the establishment and scope of a right-of-way. Federal law should govern rightsof-way.
If federal law were applied to the scope of the Burr Trail right-of-way,
Garfield County would have to apply to the Secretary of the Interior for
a permit to enlarge the Burr Trail. 7 ' The permit process gives the federal
public land managers a measure of control over the public lands. Otherwise, applying state law in states that have no statutorily defined width
but rather a reasonable and necessary standard such as Utah, the public
land managers operate under administrative uncertainty. Public land managers cannot know to what extent the wilderness study areas adjacent to
this road (and other sensitive or spectacular lands adjacent to other roads)
will be encroached. Public land managers need to be able to control and
plan for the lands they manage as envisioned by FLPMA.76
The Tenth Circuit found that the second Wilson factor, whether or not
application of state law would frustrate federal policy, favored the continued use of state law.77 The court found no frustration of federal policy
of functions.7 In fact, the court stated that a federal definition would be
an administrative burden.79 However, the conflict between centralized
management of rights-of-way created by FLPMA and the differing state
definitions of rights-of-way which leave federal public land managers
unable to provide long-range planning, is not addressed by the court.
Perhaps a federal definition is unnecessary in states which have established
a numerical width for rights-of-way, as the defined width provides some
certainty for planning. However, those states which have no defined width
but a reasonable and necessary standard provide no guidelines for systematic planning. As a result, FLPMA's clearly stated intention to provide
72. Id. § 17640).
73. Id. § 1764(0).
74. Id. § 1765. The terms and conditions which can be included in the right-of-way include
measures to minimize damage to scenic and esthetic values; to protect water, air, and habitat quality;
and to protect public health. Id.
75. id. § 1761(a)(6).
76. Id. § 1701.
77. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1082 (10th Cir. 1988).
78. Id.
79. Id. The court stated that new federal standards would require remeasurement of rights-ofway across the country and "choke BLM's ability to manage the public lands." id.
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a means for centralized and systematized federal planning is frustrated.'
Federal law, therefore, should govern those states without numerical
limitations. For consistent and centralized management of all federal
public lands, federal law should pre-empt even states with laws giving a
defined width for the right-of-way.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that the third Wilson factor, the impact
of federal rule on existing relationships under state law, strongly supported
the use of state law.8" The court reasoned that federal definition of an
R.S. 2477 right-of-way would undermine local management and disturb
property relationships which have developed around "each particular
state's definition of the scope of an R.S. 2477 road." 8 2 However, existing
relationships need not be impaired under FLPMA. For example, FLPMA's
regulations of rights-of-way would not prohibit expansion of an R.S.
2477 road. 3 Rather, the states could apply for expansion pursuant to
FLPMA procedures." FLPMA procedures require that an applicant submit
information on use and its effect.8" Further details may be required if
significant impact on the environment may be caused.86 Secondly, existing
R.S. 2477 roads are not eliminated. 7 Furthermore, existing property
relationships are, at the worst, no more uncertain under FLPMA's standards than under state standards of reasonable and necessary. In fact,
FLPMA provides a detailed, written procedure for altering existing property relationships. 8 Existing relationships may, therefore, be improved
under federal law.
CONCLUSION
Public land managers are directed to manage the public lands for a
variety of public uses in a systematic and planned manner under FLPMA.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in SierraClub v. Hodel instead ensures that
management of public lands with R.S. 2477 roads will be inefficient,
variable, and problematic. A federal definition of the scope of an R.S.
2477 right-of-way would provide for planning on federal lands where the
government's previous open-ended invitation to allow rights-of-way has
created an unorganized mosaic of roads.
CATHERINE L. BUTCHER
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43 U.S.C. § 1701.
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